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The Network of Online Stolen Data Markets: How Vendor Flows Connect Digital
Marketplaces

Abstract: In the face of market uncertainty, illicit actors on the darkweb mitigate risk by
displacing their operations across digital marketplaces. In this study, we reconstruct market
networks created by vendor displacement to examine how digital marketplaces are connected
on the darkweb and identify the properties that drive vendor flows before and after a law
enforcement disruption. Findings show that vendors’ movement across digital marketplaces
creates a highly connected ecosystem; nearly all markets are directly or indirectly connected.
These network characteristics remain stable following a law enforcement operation; prior
vendor flows predict vendor movement before and after the interdiction. The findings inform
work on collective patterns in offender decision-making and extend discussions of
displacement into digital spaces.
Keywords: digital marketplaces, crime displacement, social network analysis, offender
decision-making
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INTRODUCTION
The emergence of digital marketplaces for the sale of illicit goods has transformed the illicit
economy. Digital marketplaces provide centralized platforms for sellers to advertise their
products, connect with buyers, and expand their clientele. These marketplaces enable new and
exclusively virtual transactions and complement illicit exchanges that occur offline (Leukfeldt,
Kleemans and Stol 2017).
Digital marketplaces are not a new phenomenon, yet evidence shows that only recently
have vendors begun to displace their operations across multiple marketplaces at higher rates
(Ladegaard 2020). The movement of vendors across digital marketplaces suggests they have
become increasingly interdependent; that is, what happens on one marketplace affects the
marketplaces around it. Law enforcement interventions, including the seizure of a marketplace,
impact surrounding markets, displacing vendors to other platforms. The flow of ‘market
refugees’ from seized to neighboring markets has been identified as one of the focal
mechanisms through which the online economy has remained resilient to interventions
(Ladegaard 2020). Vendors can maintain their online identities and reconnect with existing and
new clients on similarly situated digital platforms.
Crime displacement is central to criminological scholarship. Where offenders resume
their illicit activities following an intervention sheds insight into the emergence of hot spots
and the ability to deter crime (Braga et al. 2019). Yet, we know little about what motivates
offenders’ decisions to move their illicit activities to a new location - physical or otherwise.
Digital marketplaces offer a unique opportunity to extend discussions of crime displacement
to online environments. Vendors, their products, and transactions often leave a record,
providing mass digital traces across illicit marketplaces and large populations of vendors as
they unfold. Digital records from online marketplaces offer a unique opportunity to investigate
crime displacement, allowing us to pinpoint where crime moves to and the pathways it takes
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to get there. This extends current discussions of displacement and offender decision-making to
include where offenders move to (also see Hatten and Piza 2021).
The current study adopts a network approach to better understand how digital
marketplaces are connected through vendor displacement and assess vendors’ decisions to
move between markets. Specifically, we ask two interrelated questions: 1) how are digital
marketplaces on the darkweb connected through vendor flows, and 2) does the overarching
structure of the network help explain vendor flows before and after a law enforcement
intervention? To answer these questions, we reconstruct vendor flows across

digital

marketplaces on the darkweb and examine the connectivity of these marketplaces before and
after a major interdiction. We then use exponential random graph models to identify the
correlates of vendor flows and assess whether the drivers of vendor movement are disrupted
following a law enforcement intervention. Together, the study aims to inform broader
processes about crime displacement as it extends to digital spaces.
We begin with a review of digital marketplaces on the darkweb with a focus on their
maturation from more centralized to decentralized illicit economies. We then connect this work
with research on the impact of interdictions on darknet markets, theoretically grounding our
discussion in rational choice and social learning theories. We then detail a mass longitudinal
data collection effort to track vendor flows across multiple large-scale marketplaces and the
social network methods used to examine the connectivity of this darknet ecosystem. After
looking at the aggregate patterns driving vendor flows, we assess the impact of a law
enforcement seizure on vendor movement. We conclude by discussing the implications of the
findings for advancing criminological theory on crime displacement and offender decisionmaking.
CRIME DISPLACEMENT IN DIGITAL SPACES
Digital marketplaces on the darkweb
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In 2011, Silk Road became one of the first large-scale marketplaces to sell illicit goods on the
darkweb. Adopting a similar infrastructure to legal e-commerce sites, such as Amazon and
eBay, it set the stage for the trade of illicit goods, facilitating more than $300k in transactions
daily (Barratt 2012; Soska and Christin 2015). At its launch, Silk Road was one of a handful
of marketplaces providing an online platform for illicit e-commerce; however, its success was
accompanied by the emergence of competitors and its downfall even more so. In the months
following the marketplace’s seizure, several other marketplaces emerged to fill its void (Soska
and Christin 2013), a pattern that has since continued (Van Buskirk et al. 2017).
Although digital marketplaces on the darknet are highly volatile, rarely surviving more
than a year (Branwen 2019), the larger darknet economy is resilient to external shocks. Much
of the scholarship on the impact of law enforcement disruptions have found the stock of illicit
transactions, the volume of vendors, and the number of markets recovers relatively quickly
after marketplace seizures. For instance, Décary-Hétu and Giommoni (2017) observed that a
large-scale seizure led to initial sharp drops in the number of transactions and new vendors
registering on e-commerce sites; however, were restored to similar levels within a few months
of the intervention (also see Van Buskirk et al. 2017). Likewise, Ladegaard (2019) found that
while a law enforcement crackdown led to a significant reduction in the number of available
markets, the stock of markets returned to the same level six months following the operation
and increased a year and a half later.
Indeed, rather than cripple the darknet economy, recent studies suggest that shocks to
digital marketplaces have increased their interdependency. Markets have become increasingly
interdependent because vendors are more likely to cross-list their products across multiple
marketplaces. One Europol official, commenting on this phenomenon, observed that
“[vendors] don’t just operate on one market, they cover the full spectrum of the dark web”
(Barrett 2020). Consistent with this observation, scholars have documented large numbers of
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vendors selling their products across multiple marketplaces (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni
2017; Ladegaard 2019; 2020; Norbutas, Ruiter and Corten 2020).
In one of the most persuasive accounts of the impact of law enforcement interventions
on vendor displacement, Ladegaard (2020) documented the widespread adoption of
authentication systems across digital marketplaces after a major disruption. Authentication
systems allowed marketplaces to validate vendors’ online identities, increasing the ease of
moving between markets and bringing their online reputations with them. Analyzing vendor
migration across three markets, Ladegaard (2020) found that many newly registered vendors
had migrated from recently seized digital marketplaces. In effect, the intervention triggered
marketplaces’ adoption of authentication systems, increasing the ability of illicit actors to
navigate between what were once independent marketplaces. In addition, the intervention also
led to an uptick in the number of available directories or ‘information hubs’ that provide lists
of active markets, further increasing the resources from which vendors could draw on to make
informed decisions on where to set up shop. These adaptations enabled illicit marketplaces to
resemble legal ones more closely. Online identities could be verified, and users could consult
directories with up-to-date listings of active markets.1
Crime displacement, rational choice, and offender networks
Crime displacement, which includes where individuals resume their activities after an
intervention, is of central theoretical importance to scholarship on crime and criminal justice.
Prior research shows that crime reduction efforts often lead to displacement (Gabor 1981;
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It is important to note that the increase in ease with which vendors can move between digital platforms has
resulted in two distinct but related phenomenon: 1) vendors’ cross-use of platforms (instances where vendors
advertise their products across multiple marketplaces), and 2) vendors’ migration across platforms (instances
where vendors move their product listings from an old marketplace to a new marketplace). While vendors’ crossuse of platforms and migration represent distinct phenomena, they overlap considerably. Indeed, the volatility of
darknet marketplaces has led to increases in vendors operating out of multiple marketplaces and ‘refugees’ who
move to new markets once one has shut down. Both phenomena represent movement patterns, where an offender
may move to additional sites to mitigate risk and expand their operations, and both phenomena increase the
connectivity and dependency between marketplaces. In the remainder of this article, we use the term vendor
movement and flow to capture instances where vendors expand their operations or relocate to new markets.
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Repetto 1976), with spatial relocation the most common response (Rossmo and Summers
2021). Where offenders move to is theoretically informed by rational choice theory and to a
certain extent, social learning theory.
Rational choice theory views offenders as decision-makers who engage in a cost-benefit
analysis of the anticipated risks and rewards of engaging in a criminal act, including the
decision of where to offend (Becker 1968; Clarke and Felson 1993). In applying rational choice
theory to the study of illicit markets, Reuter and Kleiman (1986) highlight the salient role of
perceived rewards and costs associated with illicit market activity, including earnings,
incapacitation, and loss of product. Indeed, this same economic calculus has been found to
underlie the decision making of actors on digital platforms, including the decision to transition
to online markets from offline markets, where profits are viewed as higher and risks as lower
(Décary-Hétu and Giommoni 2017; Martin et al. 2020).
More recently, scholars have emphasized that offender decision-making does not occur
in a vacuum but is informed by the behaviours and actions of others. In criminology, past work
has found that peers shape the anticipated risks associated with engaging in crime (McGloin
and Thomas, 2016; Pogarksy, Piquero and Paternoster 2004; Stafford and Warr 1993),
perceived benefits (Warr 2002) as well as the skills and opportunities to commit crimes
(Morselli et al. 2006; Weerman 2003). The role of peers in shaping offender decisions is a core
tenet of social learning theory, which emphasizes that individuals model the behaviours of
those around them. Indeed, social learning theory highlights peers as a key reference group
from which individuals observe and learn criminal and delinquent behaviours (Akers 2011;
Bandura 1978). Consistent with social learning theories, network frameworks offer an
important tool to understand the role of peers on behaviours, with its starting point the premise
that individuals’ actions and beliefs depend on the actions of others in their networks
(Wasserman and Faust 1994).
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In illicit online markets the role of offenders’ networks is clear. Online communities
provide individuals with access to a pool of peers who inform individuals’ risk of engaging in
illicit activity (Aldridge and Askew 2017; Holt, Blevins and Kuhns 2008). Indeed, past work
has provided anecdotal evidence that vendor decisions to move to new marketplaces are made
collectively (Ladegaard 2020). Moeller et al. (2017) succinctly summarized this phenomenon
with a quote from a darknet news forum, “If Silk Road is down, everyone moves to Agora, if
Agora is down everyone moves to Evo … and so on […] the DNM’s user base is VERY herd
like” (p. 1434). Together, these works suggest that offenders weigh the costs and benefits of
illicit activity and rely on their peer networks for informing their decision calculus, including
where to sell their illicit products.
Although prior work suggests offenders’ draw from their peers to select illicit
marketplaces, there is a notable gap in empirical work investigating precisely how peers shape
vendor flows across markets. This work suggests that peers serve as important behavioural
models, providing sources of information to evaluate a market’s benefits and costs. Instances
where vendors see many of their peers on a marketplace can increase the anticipated benefits
(e.g., seeing that other vendors have selected the platform as a valuable place to conduct their
business) and reduce perceived costs (e.g., signaling trust in the site as not a scam and providing
a public display that they have not been arrested) (Ladegaard 2020, p. 13). Alternatively, where
individuals see few of their peers on the market may increase a site’s perceived risk and
dependability. For instance, marketplaces with few of their peers may cue a site that has been
planted by agents looking to observe vendor behaviours or indicating there are few buyers on
these sites.
In sum, drawing from past theoretical work that contends peers serve as important
behavioural models from which to observe and learn offending behaviours, and more recent
work that finds illicit market participants draw from their peers to assess the costs and benefits
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of illicit activities, we expect vendors’ peers to play an important role in shaping online
behaviours. Specifically, we expect vendors to move to marketplaces where their peers have
moved to in the past, leading to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Vendor flows are more likely to occur between marketplaces where vendors’
peers have moved to in the past.
Further, drawing on past research that emphasizes disruptions increase vendor
movement across marketplaces, we expect this relationship to strengthen following a law
enforcement intervention. Indeed, we would expect the anticipated costs of participating in
illicit activity to be heightened with increased attention from law enforcement. In these
contexts, vendors may be more risk-averse and more likely to rely on their peer network to
identify trusted sites, following those vendors who were not detected in the past shutdown.
Indeed, prior work has shown that reputation and trust take on a higher market value after a
disruption (Duxbury and Haynie 2020). This line of work led to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A law enforcement disruption will strengthen the relationship between current
vendor flows and where vendors peers’ have moved to in the past.

AN EXAMININATION OF VENDOR FLOWS BETWEEN DIGITAL
MARKETPLACES
The current study empirically tests these hypotheses by reconstructing vendor flows across
digital marketplaces before and after a major law enforcement interdiction. Prior research on
crime displacement has primarily focused on whether interventions reduce crime or relocate it
to other areas (Hatten and Piza 2021). Here, we examine a large sample of offenders and
explore the properties that lead them to move to specific online spaces. In doing so, we seek to
move the scholarship on crime displacement forward, substantively and methodologically, by
looking at how vendor movement connects digital marketplaces and assessing how the
structure of market networks shapes collective patterns in offender decision-making.
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Theoretically, our study draws from rational choice and social learning theories to better
understand offender decision-making and crime displacement in online spaces. While early
scholars emphasized the necessity to study where (and when) crime occurs (Felson 2006), a
lack of detailed data precluded these efforts. The digital landscape offers a new source of data
to investigate offenders’ choice structures and provide insight into the basic determinants of
offender displacement patterns. In the current study, we explicitly test whether vendors’
decisions on where to sell their products is modeled off the behaviour of their peers. Our results
shed light on the processes through which vendors move to different illicit marketplaces, with
a focus on the economic and social forces that structure these decisions.
Methodologically, a network approach allows us to explore questions central to
scholarship on crime displacement. The questions being raised on online platforms are not new.
Crime displacement has been studied for decades, with much of this literature focusing on the
impact of crime reduction efforts on the movement of crime to new areas (Braga et al. 2019;
Weisburd et al. 2006), and more recent applications on where offenders move to (Hatten and
Piza 2021). Specifically, we conceive of marketplaces as a network in which individual ecommerce sites are nodes, and the movement of sellers between sites are edges. We then use
exponential random graph models to examine the drivers of vendor movement before and after
a law enforcement seizure of one of the largest markets. In doing so, we show how a network
approach provides a unique lens through which to explore the etiology of crime displacement.
DIGITAL TRACE DATA ON THE DARKWEB
The data for this paper comes from English-language marketplaces that sell stolen data
products hosted on the darkweb. Stolen data products are defined here as fraudulent documents
(e.g., drivers’ licenses, passports), financial items (e.g., bank accounts, credit cards), counterfeit
currencies, services to steal data (e.g., account crackers, injectors), and tutorials or guides
related to any of the preceding categories. Because some markets do not classify product
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listings or misclassify listings, we used a set of keywords to extract the relevant listings for the
analysis (see Appendix I for a full list of keywords). The data only includes marketplaces with
more than one vendor and more than 100 stolen data listings.
Marketplaces meeting these criteria were identified by consulting marketplace
directories, websites that list active markets on the darkweb and the onion.links to access them.
These websites provide a valuable resource for vendors and buyers to identify up-to-date
information on markets, including their links, as markets may switch their onion.link in efforts
to elude law enforcement or other hostile actors. In addition, marketplaces were located by
consulting popular forums on the darkweb for discussions of new markets. Digital records from
each marketplace were then compiled into a structured database using web-scraping and
parsing tools that extracted all publicly available product listings, and vendor profiles
pertaining to stolen data items (Wu et al. 2019). Our final sample comprises 17 markets, 979
unique vendor aliases, and 221,094 product listings over an approximately 12-week period
from November 15, 2020, to February 9, 2021.
Methodological barriers largely explain why prior research on the networks of digital
markets is limited. To assess vendor flows requires capturing vendor activity across a large
sample of digital marketplaces, demanding data across multiple platforms, each with thousands
of data points with different infrastructure that can change over time. Because few
comprehensive longitudinal datasets across multiple markets exist, these analyses have yet to
be carried out. However, collecting data from multiple markets creates empirical obstacles, and
the limits to our approach should be noted.
First, marketplaces on the darkweb are notoriously unstable. Markets often go down for
maintenance and are not accessible for extended periods. Because of this, we knowingly omit
some listings if the market went down during the scraping period. Our data collection approach
partially overcomes this limitation, as we scraped the markets weekly and then aggregated this
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data over 4-weeks, providing more comprehensive data points. However, we may be missing
listings that went up and then were taken down within shorter time intervals. Relatedly, we also
faced issues with our own scrapers with the seized market, DarkMarket, not fully scraped in
the three weeks prior to it being shut down.
One other limitation that could potentially impact our analysis should be noted. Our
data only contains information on vendors’ online aliases. It is feasible that vendors use
different aliases across marketplaces or that aliases are ‘mimicked’ by others in efforts to scam
buyers, and there is some evidence of this effect (Martin et al. 2020; van Wegberg and
Verburgh 2018). However, recent work suggests that the adoption of vendor verification
processes by website administrators has limited this possibility (Ladegaard 2020; Norbutas et
al. 2020), and others have shown that vendor aliases serve as a valid proxy for identifying
vendors’ unique identities (Broséus et al. 2016; van Wegberg and Verburgh 2018). Indeed,
vendors’ aliases provide ‘brand recognition’, and are directly tied to their online reputations,
one of the main ways customers select sellers (Duxbury and Haynie 2018). Although not
perfect, in the absence of more reliable approaches we follow past work (Décary-Hétu and
Giommoni 2017; Ladegaard 2018; 2019) and treat each vendor alias as unique. In doing so, we
are conservative in our approach, requiring exact matches of vendor aliases to be classified as
the same vendor.
To help interpret our quantitative findings, we also reached out to vendors to conduct
interviews on the factors that structured their decisions to set up storefronts on digital
marketplaces. We recruited vendors who made at least one sale on a darknet market in the
month preceding the recruitment message. In total, 865 unique vendors fitting these criteria
were identified. Due to market volatility, our research team was only able to contact 360
vendors across 12 markets. Specifically, 360 vendors were contacted between 4/14/2021 and
5/1/2021 and asked to participate in an asynchronous interview on an encrypted platform of
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their choice. Follow-up messages were sent two weeks after the first participation request.
From the 360 vendors contacted, twelve replied. Of those twelve, one completed the full
interview, and one completed a partial interview. Content from these interviews is incorporated
to provide insight into the decision-making processes underpinning vendor movement;
however, we emphasize our limited sample, which we return to in the limitations.
ANALYTIC APPROACH
Our analysis focuses on the social networks created by vendor flows in which the nodes
represent markets, and the ties represent the stock of vendors who move between any set of
markets. Conceptualizing and measuring vendor flows as market-level social networks allows
us to assess the structural features of the network and permit the analyses of the mechanisms
driving the structure of the observed market network. We measure the market networks in the
one-month period before and after the seizure of one of the largest marketplaces on the darkweb
- DarkMarket. We begin by describing the structural characteristics of the market networks,
including stability in these structures over time. This includes properties of the network graph
such as its overall clustering (density), local clustering (clustering coefficient), and the extent
to which vendor movement is centralized around a few key markets (degree centralization).
We then use exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to examine the local processes that
shape global patterns in the structure of vendor flows, and whether these processes change
before and after the market seizure.
Seizure of DarkMarket
The seizure of the DarkMarket on January 11, 2021, by Europol authorities closely resembles
a long line of enforcement interventions aimed at curbing illicit activity on the darkweb. At the
time of its operation, DarkMarket was identified as one of the largest marketplaces for illicit
goods on the darkweb (Europol 2021). Overnight, the site was taken down, with law
enforcement seizing the servers that hosted the website and arresting the alleged operator of
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the market. Its takedown provides a unique opportunity to test how an intervention impacts
vendor flows across markets and is consistent with other studies that have tested the impact of
law enforcement interventions on digital marketplaces (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni 2017;
Ladegaard 2019; van Buskirk et al. 2017).
Dependent variable: Vendor flows between digital marketplaces
The dependent variable measures the intensity of vendor flows between any two sets of digital
marketplaces involved in the sale of stolen data. The networks are two-mode network affiliation
data that records all markets a vendor advertised stolen data products (vendor-by-market) and
the dates they were recorded as listing these products. The affiliation networks are then
converted into networks of co-affiliation by creating a new matrix that records the number of
vendors who moved between any pair of markets. The resulting data is a one-mode network
(market-by-market) with the same market listed in the rows and columns of the matrix. The
value of each cell in the market matrix indicates the number of vendors who passed from the
sender market (rows) to the receiver market (columns), allowing us to identify the stock of
vendors who listed stolen data products in one market (Market A), and then began listing stolen
data products on another (Market B). As such, markets are connected if 1) a vendor expanded
the number of marketplaces they are on (listed products on Market A at time t and then listed
products on Market B at time t + 1), or 2) a vendor left a marketplace and joined a new one
(discontinued listing products on Market A at time t and then began listing products on Market
B at time t + 1). Thus, ties between markets are directed and valued, indicating the direction
of the vendor flow and the intensity of the flow, with more vendors moving between any two
sets of markets having higher values. We measure our dependent variable at two time points,
one month before the seizure of DarkMarket (pre-seizure network) and one month after the
seizure of DarkMarket (post-seizure network).
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To control for the fact that certain markets may have greater opportunity for higher outflows based on the total vendor population on that market, we measure vendor out-flows as the
number of vendors who move from the market as the proportion of all vendors on the market
at time t. After calculating the ratio of market out-flow to the market vendor population across
all pairs of markets, we use quartiles to determine thresholds between markets that send few
vendors and those that send many vendors. The quartiles classify the edges into categories
based on the intensity of vendor flows, with lower values indicating a lower proportion of outflow and higher values indicating a higher proportion of out-flow. This approach was adopted
from analyses of human migration networks to control for countries of different sizes (Vogtle
and Windzio 2016).
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs)
While the network statistics allow us to describe patterns in vendor flows, the use of ERGMs
allows us to test 1) the mechanisms that drive the formation of the market networks and 2) the
impact of a law enforcement interdiction on disrupting the structure of vendor flows between
markets. ERGMs model the likelihood of tie formation within the observed network as a
function of both actor attributes and characteristics of the network itself. ERGMs are uniquely
suited to answer our research question, as they provide a means to overcome the problem of
endogeneity that is inherent to network data and thus violates assumptions of traditional
regression techniques (Robin, Lewis and Wang 2012). ERGMs resolve the problem of nonindependence by explicitly modeling how one network tie influences the likelihood of other
network ties (Lusher, Koskinen and Robins 2013). Further, ERGMs allow us to explicitly test
peer effects by including network features as covariates in the model. This is key to the current
study, which aims to directly test whether patterns in vendor displacement are influenced by
the behaviours of other vendors.
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The longitudinal nature of the data provides two analytical approaches for modeling
change in the market networks: 1) a temporal ERGM (TERGM) with binary network data, or
2) two separate ERGMs (pre- and post- seizure) with valued network data and a lagged dyadic
covariate for prior network structure. The first option, TERGMs extend standard ERGMs by
modeling the extent to which the edges (and non-edges) are stable across observations.
However, current applications of TERGM are restricted to binary data, and thus would
potentially treat markets with high and low volumes of vendor out-flows as equivalent,
conflating very different marketplace profiles. In contrast, the second option, valued ERGMs,
extends standard ERGMs by also modeling whether a covariate increases or decreases the value
of an edge between network actors (Krivitsky 2012). As such, valued ERGMs allow us to
assess not only which markets experience vendor flows but also the intensity of these flows,
allowing us to measure the stock of vendor movement across markets.
Valued ERGMs require specifying a reference distribution to model how edge values
are distributed among network actors. Here, we use a Poisson-reference distribution to model
the overall network (Krivitsky 2012). We estimate the likelihood and intensity of ties forming
between markets using two classes of predictors: nodal covariates and structural covariates.
Nodal covariates test whether actor attributes impact their probability of receiving or forming
a tie and the intensity of that tie. Nodal covariates are dyad independent as the likelihood any
pair of nodes will have a network tie depends on their attributes but is not conditional on other
network ties. Structural covariates test whether properties of the network itself impact the
probability any pair of nodes will have a network tie and the intensity of that tie. Structural
covariates are dyad dependent, with the probability of a tie being modeled as conditional on
other network ties. Together, these covariates offer different insights into the local processes
that dictate collective patterns in vendor flows.
Nodal covariates
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Number of vendors is a measure of the number of unique vendor aliases on the
marketplace at time t. This measure serves as a proxy of market supply and is theoretically
informed by rational choice perspectives, which contend that economic calculations, including
supply and demand, drive illicit activity on and offline (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu 2016;
Décary-Hétu and Giommoni 2017; Demant, Munksgaaard and Houbourg 2016; Reuter and
Kleiman 1986). We would expect greater supply (i.e., more vendors) to reduce the likelihood
vendors would join an already competitive market. However, we also recognize that the
number of vendors may also impact vendors’ risk assessment for joining the market,
independent of financial considerations. Indeed, past work has shown the presence of others
impacts the decision to engage in illicit activity, increasing an individual’s perceived
anonymity and decreasing the anticipated sanctions with engaging in the activity (McGloin and
Thomas 2016). Thus, is it also possible to conceive that markets with more vendors will attract
additional vendors to the market.
Price change is a measure of the extent to which listing prices change on the
marketplace at time t. We measure the average price change of a product listing by taking the
same listing and comparing its price at weekly intervals. We measure this across all listings
and then take the average over the four-week period, providing the average price change across
product listings on the market. This measure serves as a proxy of a marketplace’s demand, an
approach consistent with other studies (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni 2017). Similar to our
measure of market supply, we draw from the rational choice perspective that shows vendors
are motivated by financial incentives (Martin et al. 2020; Reuter and Kleiman 1986). We thus
expect vendors to be more attracted to marketplaces with increases in demand (price increases)
and less attracted to marketplaces with drops in demand (price decreases).
In addition, directed networks offer the opportunity to investigate how market
covariates impact the probability of sending ties or receiving ties. Thus, for both nodal
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covariates described - number of vendors and price change - we examine the impact of the
nodal attribute on out-degree (the likelihood a market will send high out-flows of vendors to
other markets), and in-degree (the likelihood a market will receive high in-flows of vendors
from other markets) , allowing us to disentangle vendor decisions to leave old markets, from
vendor decisions to join new ones.
Network covariates
Density is modeled using the sum parameter, which indicates the expected value of a
tie between any pair of markets based on the value of all observed network ties (Handcock et
al. 2021). The sum term is analogous to an intercept in standard regression techniques,
reflecting the baseline edge value across network actors.
Reciprocity is modeled using the mutual term, which estimates the likelihood a tie
between any pair of network nodes will be reciprocated (Handcock et al. 2021). That is, the
extent to which vendors from Market A move to Market B also influences whether vendors
from Market B move to Market A. Reciprocity is a well-established network process that can
impact network structure, serving as an important control for estimating structural processes.
Transitivity is measured using the transitiveweights term, which examines whether a tie
value in the network could be explained by triad closure. Transitivity occurs in networks when
ties between two sets of actors increase the likelihood of a tie between a third actor. In our case,
transitivity allows us to test whether vendor flows are likely to move between markets that have
a tie in common, and thus whether clustering dictates how vendors’ move between markets.
Prior research on criminal networks has observed that illicit networks are more likely to adopt
decentralized and secure structures following a law enforcement intervention (Morselli,
Giguère and Petit, 2007; Ouellet et al. 2017). However, recent work on digital marketplaces
has suggested that vendors are more likely to displace their operations following a market
seizure, which would suggest that they become more connected and less secure. A negative
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effect for this term this would support the former hypothesis (more secure structures), while a
positive effect would support the latter hypothesis (more efficient structures) with greater
clustering in network ties.
Prior network structure is our main covariate and is modeled using a dyadic covariate
term, which entails the adjacency matrix of vendor flows in the preceding four-week period,
i.e., a lagged dependent variable. The dyadic covariate term allows us to test the hypothesis
that vendor flows are more likely to occur between markets in which they have occurred in the
past and whether a law enforcement operation strengthens or interrupts this peer effect. A
positive and statistically significant effect would suggest that vendor flows are structured by
where their peers moved in the fast. Should this effect become stronger in the post-seizure
network, this would suggest vendors increase their reliance on their peers to decide where to
sell their illicit products.
RESULTS
We present our results in two stages. The first stage describes the structural features of the
digital marketplaces before and after a law enforcement seizure. This stage aims to determine
the extent to which vendor flows connect the various marketplaces and the features of these
networks. The second stage explains the generative processes that led to the observed networks,
presenting the results from the ERGMs. This stage aims to identify the basic explanatory
variables associated with vendor displacement across markets and whether this changes
following a disruption. Across both sections, we supplement quantitative findings with
accounts from our interviews with vendors.
How vendor flows connect digital marketplaces
Figure 1 depicts the marketplace networks before and after a law enforcement seizure. Each
node in the network represents a market involved in the sale of stolen data on the darknet. The
size of the node indicates the extent to which vendors moved to that market: larger nodes signal
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markets that received vendor flows from a greater number of markets. The edges show the
intensity of the vendor flows between markets, with thicker edges representing a higher stock
of vendors moving between these markets and arrows indicating the direction of the flows.
Figure 1 highlights two key features of the network. First, digital marketplaces on the
darkweb are highly connected. The flow of vendors across digital marketplaces creates a
network that links almost all markets into a single component. Nearly all marketplaces are
directly or indirectly connected to one another through vendor flows. Second, this connectivity
persists before and after a major law enforcement intervention. Together, this figure provides
a first look at the structure of vendor flows across digital marketplaces, showing the connected
nature of the darknet ecosystem.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the market networks, providing a more
detailed understanding of how vendor flows are distributed across the network. The pre-seizure
market network consists of 17 markets and 95 ties connecting them. A network density of .349
before the seizure of DarkMarket indicates that 35 percent of all possible ties between network
actors are observed in the market. The clustering coefficient looks at the local connectivity of
the market network, the extent to which ties are clustered around actors. A clustering coefficient
of .676 suggests that there is a relatively high degree of clustering within markets. Degree
centralization indicates whether network ties are concentrated around a few central actors, with
higher values indicating higher concentrations (Freeman 1979). In-degree centralization
captures the extent to which a few markets receive the majority of ties. In contrast, out-degree
centralization captures the extent to which a few markets send the majority of ties. Prior to the
seizure, markets that received vendors tended to be more centralized with an in-degree
centralization of .401. In contrast, markets that sent vendors tended to be slightly more
distributed across marketplaces, with an out-degree centralization of .276.
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Vendor flows pre-law enforcement seizure

Vendor flows post-law enforcement seizure

Figure 1. Vendor flows between digital marketplaces on the darknet
Notes: Node size indicates a market’s in-degree. Edge width captures the intensity of vendor flows, with thicker edges indicating a higher volume of vendors flowing between
any pair of markets and arrows the direction of the flow. One isolate in the pre-seizure network, Yakuza Market, is not shown.
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Table 1. The network structure of vendor flows between digital marketplaces on the
darkweb
Measure
Pre-seizure network
Post-seizure network
Size
17
17
Edges
95
122
Density
.349
.449
Clustering coefficient
.676
.838
In-degree centralization
.401
.301
Out-degree centralization
.276
.364

Consistent with the pre-seizure network, the post-seizure network consists of 17
markets, but they are better connected with a higher number of ties between them, 122 edges
as compared to 95 edges before the seizure. Although DarkMarket was seized, we include it in
the post-seizure network to observe the out-flow of vendors to other markets. The post-seizure
market network becomes more connected, with the density increasing to .449 and the clustering
coefficient to .838, as compared to the pre-seizure network. This suggests that vendor flows
became more dispersed, with vendors connecting more of the markets, a finding consistent
with prior work that suggests vendor flows increased following an intervention (Ladegaard
2020). While out-degree centralization increases slightly across the pre- and post-seizure
period, in-degree centralization drops slightly in the post-seizure period. This suggests markets
sending vendors become slightly more concentrated around a few markets, consistent with the
takedown of DarkMarket and large outflows from this market. In addition, vendor in-flows
become slightly less centralized; the network figure confirms this, highlighting a larger core
group of markets that received greater vendor in-flows after the law enforcement seizure.
The tendency for vendors to move across multiple platforms can be seen in one vendor’s
account of how they choose which marketplaces to sell their products: “I initially got
grandfathered into one of the top markets places also known as white house market, thats where
all the real players are. From white house i was able to get vendor bond waived on almost every
other market place”. Another vendor emphasized that having multiple storefronts minimized
any concerns about a market going down: “i have plenty of backup storefronts already active
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and my customers will know how to find me not super difficult.” This finding confirms what
has been found by others, setting up shop across multiple marketplaces is facilitated by
marketplace administrators (waiving vendor fees for established vendors), and is a strategy for
vendors’ coping with the volatility of markets. In the next section, we explore the processes
that lead vendors to select specific marketplaces.
The correlates of vendor flows between digital markets on the darkweb
Table 2 introduces the results for the Poisson ERGMs, which model the intensity of vendor
flows between any pair of markets. We estimate two models: the predictors of vendor flows
pre-seizure (left) and vendor flows post-seizure (right). For both sets of models, we include the
same set of nodal and structural covariates. For the pre- and post-seizure networks, the prior
network structure term entails the lagged adjacency matrix of vendor flows in the prior fourweek period. In the post-seizure network, this term entails the adjacency matrix of the preseizure network. In the pre-seizure network, this term entails the adjacency matrix of the market
network 4-weeks prior to the pre-seizure network.
Table 2. Poisson exponential random graph models predicting vendor flows between
digital marketplaces
Pre-seizure network
Post-seizure network
Model 1
Model 2
Sum
-.233 (.220)
-.824*** (.232)
Market variables
N vendors – receiving market
-.001 (.001)
.003† (.001)
N vendors – sending market
-.003* (.001)
.004* (.001)
Price change – receiving market
-.009 (.024)
-.040** (.013)
Price change – sending market
-.114** (.039)
-.034*** (.009)
Network variables
Reciprocity
-.582* (.240)
-.918*** (.189)
Transitivity
.290 (.189)
.854*** (.220)
Prior network structure
.670*** (.139)
.340*** (.123)
AIC
-32.16
-62.36
BIC
-3.31
-33.51
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10

Table 2 shows that vendor flows prior to the seizure of DarkMarket were guided by the
number of vendors and prices. The negative and significant effect for the number of vendors –
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sending market indicates that markets with more vendors were less likely to experience outflows of vendors to other marketplaces. The finding that vendors are less likely to move away
from markets with a high number of vendors aligns with past work, which observes individuals’
perceptions of risks decreases when more peers are present (McGloin and Thomas 2016). The
negative and significant effect for price change – sending market indicates that markets that
had a drop in listing prices were more likely to experience out-flows of vendors to other
markets. The finding that markets with a drop in demand are consistent with core tenets of
rational choice and the well-established finding that offender decision-making is structured by
financial motives (Martin et al. 2020; Reuter and Kleiman 1986). Together, these results show
that marketplace factors shaped vendor decisions to displace their operations but not where
they chose to move to.
In terms of the network variables, the reciprocity term had a negative and significant
effect, showing that out-flows of vendors to other markets tended not to be reciprocated from
the receiving market. However, the transivity term had null effects on vendor flows, showing
no clustering within the pre-seizure network. In support of our main hypothesis, the network
lag term - prior network structure - had a positive and significant effect, indicating that the
movement of vendors between markets was guided by the collective patterns of where
individuals had moved in the past.
The model of vendor flows after the seizure of DarkMarket, suggests a change in vendor
preferences for selecting marketplaces. Specifically, we observe positive and significant effects
for both the number of vendors – receiving market and the number of vendors – sending market,
showing that marketplaces with a higher number of vendors were more likely to experience
out-flows and in-flows of vendors. Thus, after a major marketplace was seized, vendors
responded by moving to markets where there were more vendors; however, they also left
markets that had higher numbers of vendors. The former result is consistent with theoretical
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expectations that vendors would move to sites where there were more vendors, potentially
signally greater anonymity, where they were less likely to be singled out and hidden within a
larger group. However, the finding that vendors left markets with a higher number of vendors
contrasts with what we found in the pre-seizure market, potentially suggesting that the
disruption may have made vendors more risk-averse to remain on the same market, and more
inclined to expand their operations.
Price changes remained a significant factor for shaping vendor out-flows and helped
explain vendor in-flows in the post-seizure models. After the seizure of DarkMarket, there was
a negative and significant effect for both price change – receiving market and price change –
sending market, indicating vendors were more likely to move to and from markets that had
drops in prices. Although counterintuitive at first, this finding may also be partially explained
by the tendency for vendors to look for their own deals, which they can then resell. For instance,
one vendor explained, “If I see something that’s a good deal i will buy it just for the sole
intention to resell but always bulk listings obviously, that’s how you make money.” From this
perspective, vendors may be attracted to marketplaces from which they can also source their
products more efficiently.
Consistent with the pre-seizure model, the reciprocity term is negative and significant,
indicating that vendor flows were not reciprocated across marketplaces after the intervention.
In contrast to the pre-seizure model, the transitivity term is positive and significant, indicating
that after the seizure there was clustering of vendor flows between markets, with vendors more
likely to move to markets that had a shared market in common. This result is consistent with
our descriptive findings that showed the network became more clustered following the law
enforcement seizure. Lastly, consistent with the pre-seizure network, the prior network
structure term remains positive and significant. This provides support for our first hypothesis
that vendors were more likely to move to markets that their peers had moved to in the past.
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However, we do not find evidence for our second hypothesis, which expected this relationship
to become stronger in the post-seizure network. Rather, we find that vendor flows stayed
relatively stable before and after the intervention.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we find that digital marketplaces on the darkweb are highly connected
through vendors who span multiple platforms. Further, we observe that vendors do not
randomly select into markets, and these micro-preferences produce aggregate level patterns
that generate the ecosystem’s structure. Below we detail the main findings of our study and
discuss how they build on prior theoretical and empirical work on offender networks and
displacement.
The current study extends investigations of crime displacement and offender-decision
making to show that where offenders decide to commit their crimes is shaped by their peers.
Vendors were more likely to select into marketplaces where their peers had moved to in the
past, and this finding stayed consistent before and after a law enforcement disruption. This
result is consistent with larger propositions from social learning theory emphasizes the role of
peers in offender decision making (Akers 2011). Although our data do not allow us to uncover
the mechanisms that underlie peer effects, prior research offers some clues. Peers shape the
perceptions of costs and benefits of deviance, including perceived sanction risk (McGloin and
Thomas 2016; Pogarsky et al. 2004; Stafford and Warr; 1993) and the anticipated rewards
(Warr 2002). In digital marketplaces, vendors observing their peers move to another market
may provide cues that the market is trustworthy. Indeed, scholars have long emphasized that a
dominant driver of illicit market activity is trust, with buyers more likely to purchase products
from trustworthy vendors, more so than the cost of the products being purchased (Duxbury and
Haynie 2018, also see Diekmann et al. 2014), and reputation takes on a higher market value
after a disruption (Duxbury and Haynie 2020). Our results suggest that just as buyers pick up
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cues on trustworthy sellers from other buyers’ experiences, vendors also rely on their networks
to assess which markets are trustworthy on which to sell their wares. In essence, seeing their
peers move to a new marketplace serves as an endorsement of the platform.
In addition, our study’s findings showed that marketplace networks became more
connected after a law enforcement intervention, a result that runs counter to the well
documented finding that illicit networks tend to adopt more secure and decentralized structures
in the face of risk and uncertainty (Morselli et al. 2007; Ouellet et al. 2017). The different
responses of criminal networks across offline and contexts may be partially explained by the
anonymity afforded by the darknet. A key consideration as to whether a network will adopt
secure structures hinges on if they have access to trusted participants or depend on more risky
affiliates (Morselli et al. 2007). When risk increases, individuals may protect themselves by
adopting more secure network positions where they are less dependent (or connected) to these
less trusted others. In online markets, an individual’s identity remains hidden to the market
participants, and thus their networks are less subject to concerns that predominate offline
criminal activity. In these anonymous contexts, vendors more closely resemble sellers on licit
e-commerce sites, relying on online reviews and ratings to establish the quality of their
products. When markets become more volatile, vendors can mitigate risks by already having
established a storefront on another platform where their vendors can easily find them. Indeed,
one of our vendor interviews emphasized that setting up multiple storefronts provide ‘backups’,
allowing them to mitigate the loss from market closures.
Lastly, we observe that economic calculus drives offenders’ decisions on where to sell
their products online. Specifically, we found that vendors were more likely to move to and
from marketplaces that recently experienced drops in demand. The finding that vendors move
from marketplaces that experienced drops in demand is consistent with a rational choice
perspective that identifies financial factors as weighing heavily in offender decision-making,
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with the aim of maximizing profits (Reuter and Kleiman 1986). However, the finding that
vendors move to marketplaces that also experience drops in demand runs counter to this logic.
While counterintuitive at first, this may indicate that vendors who were experiencing a decrease
in demand decided to expand their research to other markets, in line with prior research which
has found vendors on multiple markets are more likely to reap higher profits (Ladegaard 2020;
Norbutas et al. 2020), and vendor interviews expressing how lower prices allow vendors to
capitalize by reselling these products on their own terms. Vendors may absorb these costs in
the short-term, establishing themselves on the platform on the belief that demand will resume
later, a proposition consistent with past work (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni 2016).
Limitations
Our study relies on vendors involved in the sale of stolen data products on digital marketplaces
on the darkweb. Stolen data items are the second largest category of illicit products on darkweb
marketplaces (after drugs); however, they only represent a subset of all illicit online listings
(Hutchings and Holt 2014). While we can capture a high number of markets, we do not have
data on all vendors active on these markets, or all markets active on the darkweb and clearnet.
Limiting our analysis to the subset of products on the darkweb provides the necessary
infrastructure to compare multiple vendors using the same variables; however, this could
potentially obscure some patterns that may be observed in these other settings, and thus
findings apply primarily to this context.
Further, our analysis only focuses on the impact of a single shock to digital
marketplaces on the darkweb - the seizure of DarkMarket on January 11, 2021. However, this
only captures one of many law enforcement interventions on the darknet. Earlier interventions,
including the shutdown of Empire market in August of 2020, may still be creating waves on
the darknet where markets and vendors are recovering from these earlier shocks. Relatedly,
while darknet marketplaces provide troves of data on illicit transactions, they miss data on
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some of the core covariates of criminality, including offender backgrounds, such as sex, and
age, which may impact decisions to offend, and where they decide to commit their offences.
Lastly, we emphasize that our interviews rely on a small sample. Our low response rate
may be a function of our sampling frame, recruitment strategy, or a combination of both.
Vendors who sell stolen data products on the darknet may perceive the risks associated with
being interviewed as outweighing the rewards. Thus, it is our belief the response rate could be
improved by increasing the rewards (incentivizing participants) or decreasing the perceived
risks (establishing trust and credibility) of participation. In addition, we also take note of the
small samples of recent research adopting similar approaches, including the largest sample of
qualitative interviews being 13 vendors selling drugs on these platforms (Martin et al. 2020).
Strategies, such as developing rapport in online spaces, including partnering with established
websites, may partially explain the discrepancies, and we encourage further work in this area.
CONCLUSION
Our study advances a network framework to understand digital marketplaces as an ecosystem.
Drawing from data across multiple marketplaces, we showed illicit marketplaces are highly
connected through vendors who move between different platforms, and that these networks
became more connected after a disruption. Investigating the local mechanisms that drove the
structure of the observed market network, we observed that economic considerations including
fluctuations in market demand structured vendor flows between markets. We also found that
vendor flows were more likely to occur between marketplaces where their peers had moved to
in the past, providing an endorsement of the platform. Together, our study demonstrates the
importance of bringing together economic and social forces, including peers’ behaviours, for
explanations of crime displacement and offender-decision making.
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Appendix I. Online Stolen Data Keywords
Category
Fraudulent Documents
(personal identity)

Financial (bank accounts,
dumps, credit cards)

Counterfeit Currency

Malware/Software/Services

Keywords
“birth certificate”, “camla”, “car title”, “citizenship”, “college id”,
“custom ident”, “dl template”, “dlicense”, “dls”, “drive license”,
“driver license”, “drivers license”, “driver's license”, “driving
license”, “earnings statement”, “efset”, “electricity bill”,
“electricity statement”, “entry stamp”, “fraud id”, “gmat”, “green
card”, “holograms id”, “id card”, “id pack”, “id photo”, “id scan”,
“id template”, “identity doc”, “identity set”, “ids”, “ids scan”,
“ielts”, “income template”, “insurance slip”, “license template”,
“pack of id”, “passport”, “pay stub”, “paystub”, “pp template”,
“proof of employment”, “psd template”, “registered dl”,
“registered doc”, “registered id”, “residence permit”, “scan id”,
“scotiabank”, “selfies holding id”, “social insurance number”,
“social security card”, “social security number”, “ssn”, “student
id”, “tax form”, “tax return”, “tax statement”, “template (psd)”,
“template psd”, “toeic”, “toelf”, “university id”, “utilities
statement”, “utility bill”, “utility statement”, “voter id card”, “w2
form”, “water bill”, “water statement”
“american express”, “amex”, “atm blank card”, “atm card”, “atm
cash”, “balance”, “bank acc”, “bank drop”, “bank login”, “bank
of america”, “bank statement”, “bank transfer”, “billing
statement”,”cashapp”, “cashing”, “cashout”, “chase”, “cheque”,
“cibc”, “clone card”, “credit card”, “cvv”, “debit card”,
“desjardin”, “dump”, “dumpz”, “full info”, “fullz”, “hsbc”,
“mastercard”, “moneygram”, “paypal”, “prepaid card”, “rbc”,
“routing”, “royal bank”, “scotia bank”, “td”, “transfer”, “venmo”,
“western union”, “wu transaction”, “zelle”, “visa”
(“authentic”, “cf”, “counterf”, “fake”, “undetect”, “quality”,
“genuine”, “light detector test”, “pass pen”, “pass uv”, “passes
pen test”, “passes uv test”) &
(“aud”, “bank bill”, “bank note”, “bill”, “cad”, “cash”, “currenc”,
“dinar”, “dirham”, “dolas”, “dollar”, “euro”, “frank”, “gbp”,
“krone”, “kuwaiti”, “money”, “note”, “pesos”, “pound”, “rand”,
“ringgit”, “rupee”, “sterling”, “usd”, “yuan”)
“account cracker”, “account creator”, “address changer”,
“anonymity tool”, “anonymous vpn”, “anti browser”, “anti
detect”, “anti logger”, “anti public”, “anti viral”, “anti virus”,
“bot”, “brute”, “bypass”, “carding”, “cpn profile”, “crack”,
“crypt”, “database”, “ddos”, “denial of service”, “dox”, “drop”,
“e-mail”, “email”, “exploit”, “hack”, “injection”, “keylogger”,
“live track”, “malware”, “mega pack”, “password hacking”,
“pentesting”, “perl attack”, “prox”, “ransom”, “rats”, “rdp”,
“remote administration”, “shell”, “skim”, “socks”, “software”,
“source code”, “spam”, “spreader”, “sql scanner”, “tls”, “trading
bot”, “trojan”, “virus”, “viruses”, “vm workstation”, “vpn”,
“vulnerability scanner”, “worm”,
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